The given, language, and knowledge. A critical reading of Wilfrid Sellars

Abstract

This essay examines Wilfrid Sellars’s critique of the “myth of the given” in empiricism, arguing that all knowledge—including perceptual knowledge—is mediated by a conceptual‑linguistic network. Drawing on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1971), the paper shows that Sellars’s distinction between “seeing that something is the case” and merely “seeing something” entails that experience is never pure but always situated within a “space of reasons.” This article explores parallels between this view and the Sapir‑Whorf hypothesis, as well as Kuhn’s notion of paradigm, highlighting how theoretical frameworks shape both scientific observation and everyday perception. Ontological and methodological implications of denying “pure” data are discussed, pointing out tensions concerning non‑discursive forms of knowledge (animals, infants, practical know‑how). Finally, a broadened reading is proposed that acknowledges the normative and social dimension of knowledge while still recognizing situated, embodied, and affective ways of knowing.